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T HE INVOLVEMENT OF THE COAST GUARD in immigration matters is extensive. Its wide variety of roles and missions includes: 
• Protecting the safety of life at sea, regardless of immigration status; 
• Preventing the entry of undocumented migrants into the United States 
through at,sea interdiction; 
• Facilitating parole into the United States by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) for prosecution, or turnover to another nation 
with criminal jurisdiction over the matter, of aliens found committing criminal 
acts at sea; 
• Seizing conveyances and arresting alien smugglers, and gathering 
evidence in alien smuggling cases to help ensure the successful criminal 
prosecution of those involved, and/or civil forfeiture of their vessel; 
• Inspecting vessels and facilities subject to Coast Guard jurisdiction in 
cooperation with the INS to ensure that any aliens being employed are engaged 
in activities consistent with their immigration status; 
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• Detaining aliens, when encountered on vessels subject to Coast Guard 
jurisdiction, who have entered the United States illegally, until disposition 
instructions are received from the INS; and 
• • Complying with appropriate procedures for handling claims to refugee 
status and requests for political asylum made during the course of Coast Guard 
operations. 
Despite these roles and missions, the Coast Guard is neither the architect of 
national immigration policy nor even the lead federal agency for immigration 
law enforcement. However, the task of enforcing U.S. immigration laws at sea 
rests almost exclusively with the Coast Guard. This paper first surveys the basic 
legal authority for Coast Guard interdiction and repatriation of illegal migrants 
encountered at sea, then looks at how that legal authority is exercised within 
the factual context of several different types of alien migrant interdiction 
operations. 
Basic Legal Authority 
On 14 August 1949, Title 14 of the United States Code was enacted into 
positive law. l For the Coast Guard, a key provision was 14 United States Code 
(USC) §89, which authorized the Coast Guard to 
... make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests 
upon the high seas and waters over which the U.S. has jurisdiction, for the 
prevention, detection, and suppression of violations oflaws of the United States. 
For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at any time go 
on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or operation of any law, of the 
United States, address inquiries to those onboard, examine the ship's documents 
and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary 
force to compel compliance .... 2 
14 USC §89 was initially enacted3 in response to the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Maul v. United States,4 which affirmed the jurisdiction of the 
Coast Guard over U.S. flag vessels under former §30n of the Revised Statutes 
for violations oflaws respecting the revenue. However, Justice Brandeis, in his 
concurring opinion, expressed his concern that more explicit statutory 
authority would be required to authorize seizures of vessels for violations of 
laws other than those pertaining to collection of revenues. Congress responded 
to that suggestion by adopting essentially the language that exists in 14 USC 
§89(a) today. 
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While 14 USC §89 articulates the extent of the Coast Guard's law 
enforcement authority and who may exercise it, 14 USC §2 defines the Coast 
Guard's law enforcement mission in more general terms. It states: 
The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable 
federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States; shall engage in maritime air surveillance or 
interdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the laws of the United 
States; shall administer laws and promulgate and enforce regulations for the 
promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and waters 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States covering all matters not 
specifically delegated by law to some other executive department; ... 
By virtue of the powers conferred by this statute and 14 USC §89, the Coast 
Guard is the principal federal maritime law enforcement agency of the United 
States. It i5 in this role that the Coast Guard performs the mission of alien 
migrant interdiction operations at sea. 
Despite the broad statutory authority conferred on the Coast Guard by 14 
USC the Supreme Court has held that" ... an Act of Congress ought never to 
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains."s And, under both Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas 
(High Seas Convention)6 and Article 92 of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), 7 a vessel on the high 
seas is subject solely to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state. While the 
United States is a party only to the High Seas Convention, these provisions in 
both treaties confirm existing maritime law and practice and are a codification 
of existing customary intemationallaw.8 
There are, however, several exceptions to the principle of exclusive flag 
state jurisdiction. The most commonly relied upon exception permits a warship 
to board any vessel not entitled to complete immunity if there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect it is engaged in piracy, slave trading, unauthorized 
broadcasting, or that it is a stateless vessel or of the same nationality as the 
warship.9 This is known as the "right of visit." It is a limited exercise of 
authority solely for the purpose of verification of the aforementioned 
circumstances. Unless the vessel is determined to be the same nationality as 
the warship, a stateless vessel, or a vessel engaged in piracy (or other universal 
crimes), any further exercise of complete criminal jurisdiction requires a 
separate, independent basis. 10 In immigration matters, this normally is found in 
an affirmative waiver of exclusive jurisdiction by the flag state and express 
consent by the flag state to an exercise of jurisdiction by the United States.ll 
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This waiver and consent to jurisdiction may be sought and given on a 
case~by~case basis or take the form of a standing special arrangement pursuant 
to treaty, exchange of diplomatic notes, or executive agreement. 
In October 1994, President Clinton forwarded the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea to the Senate for advice and consent. In so 
doing, the President recognized reliance on flag state consent as a basis for 
jurisdiction in immigration matters by stating: 
... the United States and other members of the international community have 
developed procedures for resolving problems that have arisen in certain 
contexts, including drug smuggling, illegal immigration and fishing, when States 
are unable or unwilling to exercise responsibility over vessels flying their flag. 
These procedures, several of which are contained in international agreements, 
typically seek to ensure the flag state gives expeditious permission to other States 
for the purpose of boarding, inspection, and where appropriate, taking law 
enforcement action with respect to its vessels (emphasis added)Y 
Thus, 14 USC §89 does not authorize the Coast Guard to conduct searches 
and seizures of foreign flag vessels carrying illegal migrants on the high seas 
without the consent of the flag state.13 However, if this consent is obtained, the 
Coast Guard may then stop the vessel on the high seas, search for illegal 
migrants, and take appropriate action consistent with United States law. 
Under 14 USC §89 (b), Coast Guard officers acting pursuant to their general 
law enforcement authority are deemed to be agents of those executive agencies 
charged with administration of a particular law. When conducting alien 
migrant interdiction operations, the Coast Guard relies on this agency theory 
to enforce compliance with the Immigration and Nationality Act on behalf of 
the INS and the Attorney General. More specifically, the Coast Guard 
enforces 8 USC § 1185 (a) (1), which states, inter alia, that it is unlawful for an 
alien to " ... enter ... or attempt to ... enter the United States except under 
such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations 
and exceptions as the President may subscribe." The Coast Guard also enforces 
the provisions of 8 USC § 1324 which make it a crime to knowingly bring, or 
attempt to bring, an alien into the United States at other than a designated 
port of entry. 
Coast Guard interdiction policy is determined largely by national security 
goals and Presidential directives. The current strategy calls for focusing United 
States maritime interdiction operations as far at sea as possible. The manner in 
which these operations are conducted, however, is dependent upon a 
combination of many factors. The primary ones are: (1) the nature and 
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magnitude of the threat, (2) the type and number of resources available, and 
(3) the applicable law. 
The remainder of this article examines the application of both the law and 
Coast Guard resources to specific migrant interdiction operations. It focuses on 
Coast Guard efforts to interdict Haitian, Cuban, Dominican, and Chinese 
migrants attempting to enter the United States illegally in overloaded and 
unseaworthy craft. The peculiar difficulties of each type of interdiction are 
illustrated with factual examples. Finally, it attempts to show how the nature 
and magnitude of migrant activity, as well as Coast Guard interdiction 
operations, is directly influenced by changes in law and policy. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
"It is undoubtedly within the power of the Federal Government to exclude 
aliens from the country."14 However, prior to the passage of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,15 aliens who 
resided in the United States or arrived at the border were accorded certain 
procedural rights under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) 16 
before being excluded or deported. Those residing illegally in the United States 
were subject to deportation only after a formal evidentiary hearing. I? Aliens 
arriving at "ports of the United States" who did not appear to the examining 
immigration officer to be clearly entitled to land were subject to a less formal 
exclusion proceeding by which they too were eventually subject to removal.18 
Whether an alien is "excluded" or "deported" turns upon whether they have 
"entered" the United States.19 Aliens who have made an "entry" are entitled to 
deportation proceedings, while those who are seeking admission but who have 
not made an "entry" are afforded only an exclusion proceeding. 
Other aliens could be prevented from entry by Executive actions that did 
not trigger any procedural rights. In Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey, the 
District court stated: 
The Immigration and Nationality Act has established procedures for the 
exclusion of aliens, including the entitlement to a hearing. See 8 USC § 1226. 
Those rights, however, are reserved for aliens arriving "by water or air at any port 
within the United States from any place outside the United States." Id . .•. Again, 
because those "exclusion or deportation" proceedings are restricted to aliens 
arriving "at any port within the United States," 8 USC § 1221, it is clear that the 
interdicted Haitians are entitled to none of these statutorily. created procedural 
rights, including the right to counsel. 20 
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In either a deportation or exclusion proceeding, an alien could seek asylum 
as a political refugee.21 Section 243 (h) (1) of the INA provided: 
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the 
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be 
threatened in any such country on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.22 
Congress thereby intended23 to incorporate the provisions of the 1951 Convention 
on the Status ofRefugees24 as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (the Convention) ,25 Article 33 of which provides: 
Article 33 ' Prohibition of expulsion or return ('refoulement') 
1. No contracting State shall expel or return (,refouler') a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group or political opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee 
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of 
the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country 
(emphasis added). 
The text of Article 33 does not apply by its terms to actions taken by a country 
beyond its borders. In fact, the language of Article 33.2 suggests that an alien 
entitled to the benefit of Article 33.1 must be located within the territory of a 
contracting state. As a result, the Supreme Court determined that since INA 
§243 was intended to incorporate the provisions of the Convention, and 
neither suggested any extraterritorial application, §243 applied only in the 
context of the domestic procedures by which the Attorney General determined 
whether to deport or exclude an alien.26 
Since 1980, the Coast Guard has been involved in operations to prevent 
illegal migrants from entering the United States and, thereby, from implicating 
any statutorily, created procedural entitlements. 
Haitian Migrant Interdiction Operations 
The near total collapse of the Haitian economy in the late 1970s and early 
1980s under the repressive regime of then "President,for,Life" Jean Claude 
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Duvalier resulted in a flood of economic migrants from Haiti attempting to 
reach the United States by boat.27 
In response, President Reagan delegated express authority to the Coast 
Guard to interdict and return illegal aliens on the high seas. He did this by 
promulgating Executive Order 12,324,28 which was signed in September of 
1981 in response to what he characterized as a "serious national problem" of 
"continuing illegal migration by sea."29 It was promulgated pursuant to the 
authority of the President under 8 USC §1182(f) and his inherent authority 
under the foreign affairs power of the Constitution30 to suspend entry or impose 
restrictions on entry of aliens. The Order directed the Secretary of 
Transportation to issue instructions to the Coast Guard to enforce the 
suspension of the entry of undocumented aliens into the United States by sea. 
It also authorized the Coast Guard to interdict certain defined vessels for this 
purpose if they were suspected of being involved in the "irregular transport of 
people,"31 or other violations of United States law on the high seas (including, 
but not limited to the INA), and to return the vessel and transport its 
passengers to the country from which they came. The defined vessels included 
"[v] essels of foreign nations with whom [the United States has] arrangements 
authorizing the United States to stop and board such vessels."32 By its terms, 
the Executive Order authorized these actions only outside the territorial waters 
of the United States. 
The United States and Haiti had entered into a bilateral agreement on 23 
September 1981,33 six days before Executive Order 12,324 was signed. That 
agreement applied to private Haitian vessels on the high seas when there was 
reason to believe that such vessels were involved in the irregular carriage of 
passengers outbound from Haiti. It gave the United States permission to board 
such vessels to determine their registry, condition, and destination, as well as 
the status of those on board. When the circumstances suggested that a 
violation of U.S. immigration laws had been or was being committed, the vessel 
and persons on board could be detained and returned to Haiti upon prior 
notification to the Haitian government. Haiti also gave assurances that 
interdicted Haitians would not be prosecuted for illegal departure. 
Interdiction of migrants at sea may be accomplished in departure, transit, or 
arrival zones. However, forward deployment of available Coast Guard 
resources, as opposed to waiting to interdict at or near landfall in the United 
States, is preferred for several reasons. First, the vessels used by migrants are 
usually grossly overloaded, unseaworthy, and incapable of making the 700~mile 
trip from Haiti to the United States without risking substantial loss of life. 
Second, aliens residing illegally in the United States or arriving at the border 
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were entitled under former §243 (h) of the INA to a deportation or exclusion 
hearing. The differences between exclusion and deportation, and the varying 
procedural protections attached to each, depended upon whether the alien 
had made an "entry" into the United States.34 Aliens making an entry were 
entitled to deportation proceedings. Those seeking admission upon arrival, but 
prior to "entry,"35 could have their status determined at an exclusion 
proceeding. Since §243 did not by its terms have extraterritorial application,36 
migrants interdicted at sea were not afforded access to either of these 
processes.37 
The best reason to interdict migrants at sea, however, is that it saves lives. 
Without the nearly constant presence of a Coast Guard cutter in relative 
proximity to the territorial sea of Haiti, many migrants bound for the United 
States would die. Haitian migrant vessels are typically crude, handmade, 
wooden,hulled vessels.38 Primarily, they are lateen or sloop,rigged sailing 
vessels of 30,50 feet in length, or more substantial double,decked, 
wooden, hulled freighters, 50,80 feet in length, with high, upswept bows, and a 
large deck house aft. The latter are generally powered by unreliable engines 
prone to mechanical failure. Most do not carry charts, compass, or navigational 
instruments of any kind. Navigation is based primarily on following the 
prevailing winds, wave patterns, and changes in water color along the Bahama 
Bank until the 100m of light from Miami is seen on the night horizon. Due to 
the large number of people on board (some may carry as many as sLx to eight 
persons for every foot of deck length) and complete lack of sanitary facilities, 
conditions on the vessels are typically appalling. Cooking, if any, may be done 
over open charcoal fires, and some vessels even carry live goats as provisions. 
The vessels usually have little freeboard due to their overloaded condition, and 
constant flooding results. 
After the migrants are removed, the vessels normally cannot be towed, due 
to either their physical condition or the presence of large numbers of migrants 
on the Coast Guard cutter. Rather than be left adrift as derelicts, where they 
could constitute a potentially deadly hazard to navigation, these vessels are 
usually destroyed. The vessels are at times unsinkable with gunfire or ramming, 
because the inherent natural buoyancy of their wooden construction often 
keeps them floating just below the surface despite the infliction of major 
damage. As a result, most cutters resort to burning the vessels to the waterline, 
then breaking up the remains by ramming or other means to minimize the size 
of the debris. 
Executive Order 12,324 expressly prohibited the return of any refugee 
without their consent.39 As a result, migrants interdicted on the high seas 
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pursuant to the Executive Order had to be screened for colorable claims to 
refugee status. For that purpose, Coast Guard cutters on patrol in the 
Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti initially had INS agents and 
Creole~speaking interpreters assigned. When a cutter came upon an 
overloaded and unseaworthy Haitian vessel bound for the United States, the 
migrants were taken on board the cutter, given an abbreviated medical 
examination, issued a blanket, and fed a meal (typically of beans and rice). Due 
to space limitations, the migrants were normally kept on the flight deck, 
forecastle, or fantail of the cutter.40 The cutter's crew would attempt to rig 
awnings to shelter the migrants as best they could from the effects of wind, 
weather, and the hot Caribbean sun beating on the steel decks of the cutter. 
The cutters also carried or improvised portable toilets, and otherwise 
attempted to treat the migrants with as much dignity as possible. 
Under Executive Order 12,324, the migrants were individually interviewed 
by INS agents while onboard the cutter to determine if any had potentially 
valid claims to refugee status. This process often took days. While their status 
was being decided, the cutter remained at sea and out of sight ofland. As time 
wore on, the migrants sometimes became impatient. With overcrowding, 
discontent, boredom, and the prospect of an imminent return to Haiti rather 
than the promise of arrival in Miami, some migrants even became belligerent.41 
Disturbances sometimes broke out on Coast Guard cutters that in a few 
instances had to be quelled through the use of physical restraints, fire hoses, or 
chemical agents such as CURB 6042 or pepper spray. 
After the interview process was complete, those who were determined to be 
economic migrants were "screened out" and repatriated. Repatriations usually 
took place dockside in Port au Prince, where the Haitians were turned over to 
the Red Cross. Those who made a colorable claim of status as a political refugee 
were "screened in" and transported to the United States so that they could file 
a formal application for political asylum. 
Between 1981 and 1991, approximately 25,000 Haitian migrants were 
interdicted by the Coast Guard. Then, on 30 September 1991, a military coup 
succeeded in overthrowing the Aristide government. In response to the 
subsequent killing and torture of hundreds of Haitians who opposed the 
military regime, a flood of migrants bound for the United States soon 
ovenvhelmed both the existing operational posture of the Coast Guard and the 
ability of the INS to screen the migrants for potential refugee status as required 
by Executive Order 12,324. 
Executive Order 12,324 was superseded by Executive Order 12,807 on May 
23,1992.43 The primary difference between the two was that Executive Order 
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12,807 no longer contained a requirement to screen migrants interdicted at sea 
for refugee status. In addressing a challenge to the new Executive Order on this 
ground, the Supreme Court said: 
During the six months after October 1991, the Coast Guard interdicted over 
34,000 Haitians. Because so many interdicted Haitians could not be safely 
processed on Coast Guard cutters, the Department of Defense established 
temporary facilities at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
to accommodate them during the screening process. Those temporary facilities, 
however, had a capacity of only about 12,500 persons. In the first three weeks of 
May 1992, the Coast Guard intercepted 127 vessels (many of which were 
considered unseaworthy, overcrowded, and unsafe); those vessels carried 10,497 
undocumented aliens. On May 22, 1992, the United States Navy determined 
that no additional migrants could safely be accommodated at Guantanamo. 
With both the facilities at Guantanamo and available Coast Guard cutters 
saturated, and with the number of Haitian emigrants in unseaworthy craft 
increasing (many had drowned as they attempted the trip to Florida), the 
Government could no longer both protect our borders and offer the Haitians 
even a modified screening process. It had to chose between allowing Haitians 
into the United States for the screening process or repatriating them without 
giving them any opportunity to establish their qualifications as refugees. In the 
judgment of the President's advisors, the first choice would not only have 
defeated the original purpose of the program (controlling illegal immigration), 
but also would have impeded diplomatic efforts to restore democratic 
government in Haiti and would have posed a life threatening danger to 
thousands of persons embarking on long voyages in dangerous crafts. The second 
choice would have advocated those policies but deprived the fleeing Haitians of 
any screening process .... 
On May 23, 1992, President Bush adopted the second choice. After assuming 
office, President Clinton decided not to modify that order; it remains in effect 
today.44 
The terms of Executive Order 12,807 provided for the repatriation of 
undocumented aliens without the benefit of any screening process. It also 
stated. that the "non,refoulement,,45 obligations of the United States under 
Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees46 do not extend to persons located outside the United States. The 
Executive Order again directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue 
appropriate instructions to the Coast Guard to enforce the suspension of the 
entry of undocumented aliens by sea and to interdict defined vessels carrying 
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such aliens. These instructions were to include directives to "return the vessel 
and its passengers to the country from which it came, or to another country ... 
provided, however, that the Attorney General, in his unreviewable discretion, 
may decide that a person who is a refugee will not be returned without his 
consent.,,47 
There have been a number of legal challenges to the Coast Guard's 
interdiction and repatriation of Haitian migrants at sea under both Executive 
Orders. In 1985, the District Court for the District of Columbia denied such a 
challenge to Executive Order 12,324, finding that §243 (h) of the INA applied 
only to those Haitians who were already in the United States.48 The next 
challenge came in 1991, alleging that the Government had failed to establish 
and implement adequate procedures to protect Haitians who qualified for 
asylum. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that since Executive 
Order 12,324 did not limit the discretion ofINS officials, migrants interdicted 
at sea could not obtain judicial review of INS decisions.49 That court also held 
that the INA did not apply extra,territorially. 
President Bush's promulgation of Executive Order 12,807 precipitated 
another round of legal challenges. The Supreme Court resolved those 
challenges by holding that repatriating migrants to Haiti without first 
determining whether they qualified as refugees was not prohibited by either 
§243 of the INA or Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees. 50 The court found that since neither of those provisions 
had extra, territorial application, migrants interdicted at sea were not entitled 
to either deportation or exclusion hearings. Therefore, there is nothing in 
domestic or international law which prevents the President or the Attorney 
General from involuntarily repatriating undocumented aliens interdicted at 
sea.51 
During fiscal year 1992 the Coast Guard interdicted 37,618 Haitian 
migrants. In response to the Haitian exodus, Operation Able Manner 
commenced on 15 June 1993 and was, at that time, the largest single peacetime 
operation in the history of the Coast Guard. It involved virtually every Coast 
Guard unit along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Today, Haitian migration has 
stabilized at an average of about 150 to 300 migrants a month, with occasional 
peaks in excess of those amounts. On 24 November 1997, 416 Haitians on an 
80,foot wooden,hulled freighter were intercepted approximately six nautical 
miles southeast of Miami Beach.52 The vessel refused to stop until shouldered 
by the Coast Guard Cutter Maui, a 11O,foot patrol boat, which prevented the 
migrants from entering the United States. This was the largest single group of 
migrants interdicted since November 1995. All were repatriated to Port au 
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Prince, except for a pregnant, nineteen,year,old female suffering from 
dehydration and possible pneumonia, who was brought to Miami for medical 
treatment. 
Despite the fact that there has been no formal agreement in place since 
1994, when the 1981 Agreement was terminated by President Aristide 
according to its terms, Haiti continues to permit repatriation of all Haitian 
migrants interdicted by the Coast Guard at sea. Since the original interdiction 
agreement was entered into by the totalitarian Duvalier regime and abrogated 
by the democratic government of Aristide, any new standing interdiction 
agreement appears unlikely in the near future. United Nations peacekeeping 
forces assisted in recent elections in Haiti, but the results were tainted by fraud, 
essentially leaving Haiti without an effective government since the resignation 
of Premier Rosny Smarth in June of 1997.53 With the departure of United 
Nations peacekeeping forces on 1 December 1997, a refusal by the Haitian 
government to accept the return of migrants for any reason could precipitate 
another mass exodus and have far,reaching consequences for both the United 
States and the Coast Guard. 
Cuban Migrant Interdiction Operations 
When Fidel Castro opened the port of Camarioca in 1965, over 6,000 
Cubans fled to the United States.54 After one of the vessels capsized, President 
Lyndon Johnson commenced eight years of "Freedom Flights," in which over a 
quarter million Cubans immigrated to the United States. 
In 1980, the Mariel Boatlift brought more than 100,000 Cubans to U.S. 
shores. These Cuban migrants enjoyed a special status that the Haitian 
migrants did not. Unlike the Haitians, the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Acr55 
permitted the Attorney General to grant permanent resident status to Cuban 
citizens present in the United States for at least one year. President Carter 
permitted the "Marielitos" to enter the United States, and Castro took full 
political advantage of this opportunity to rid Cuba of many criminals, mentally 
ill persons, and others that he considered to be undesirable elements. 
In the years after the Mariel Boadift, migrant attempts to evade Cuban 
authorities and reach the United States persisted on a small scale, but one 
which progressively increased in magnitude. Then, on 8 August 1994, Fidel 
Castro announced that the Cuban government would no longer forcibly 
prevent Cuban citizens from emigrating by boat. This policy precipitated a 
flood of "balseros" aboard homemade rafts and boats attempting to negotiate 
ninety treacherous miles across the Gulf Stream to the United States. In two 
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weeks, more than 2,700 Cubans were rescued by the units of Operation Able 
Vigil, with the rate of rescue at times reaching nearly 750 per day. 56 Many were 
lost at sea. 
In a press conference on 19 August 1994, President Clinton stated: 
In recent weeks the Castro regime has encouraged Cubans to take to the sea in 
unsafe vessels to escape their nation's internal problems. In so doing, it has ,risked 
the lives of thousands of Cubans, and several have already died in their efforts to 
leave. This action is a cold-blooded attempt to maintain the Castro grip on Cuba, 
and to divert attention from his failed communist policies. He has tried to export 
to the United States the political and economic crisis he has created in Cuba, in 
defiance of the democratic tide flOwing throughout this region. Let me be clear: 
The Cuban government will not succeed in any attempt to dictate American 
immigration policy. The United States will do everything within its power to 
ensure that Cuban lives are saved and that the current outflow of refugees is 
stopped.57 
In order to stem the tide of Cuban migrants and prevent further loss of life, 
the policy that provided for permanent resident status was terminated. 
President Clinton also ordered the Coast Guard to interdict Cubans at sea and 
transport them to Guantanamo Bay, where they received treatment similar to 
Haitian migrants interdicted at sea. From there, the United States engaged in a 
program of voluntary repatriations while negotiating with other countries to 
accept migrants into safe havens. By the end of fiscal year 1994, a total of 
38,560 Cuban migrants were interdicted.58 This exceeded the total number of 
Haitians interdicted during the mass exodus of fiscal year 1992. 
Further negotiations with the Cuban government resulted in a joint 
communique between the United States and Cuba on 2 May 1995.59 In this 
communique, the United States agreed to allow Cuban migrants to enter the 
United States only by applying for a visa or refugee status at the United States 
Interests Section in Havana. It further permits 20,000 Cubans per year to enter 
the United States legally. This agreement has facilitated the direct repatriation 
of approximately 75 percent of all Cubans intercepted at sea,60 with the 
remainder going to Guantanamo or to the United States at the direction of the 
INS.61 It also reaffirmed a commitment to in-country processing of refugee 
claims through the United States Interests Section in Havana. This policy has 
achieved its purpose of deterring dangerous migration from Cuba by boat by 
offering a safe alternative.62 Since the 2 May 1995 accord, illegal migration 
from Cuba has been significantly reduced and remains relatively stable at about 
thirty to fifty migrants per month.63 
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A legal challenge was asserted to determine whether Cuban migrants 
temporarily given safe haven at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo 
Bay could assert rights under the INA and Article 33 of the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals64 rejected the argument that leased military bases in foreign countries 
(such as Guantanamo Bay) are ports of entry or othenvise "within the United 
States" for purposes of the INA. It also held that granting safe haven did not 
create a protected liberty interest, the deprivation of which would require the 
government to provide due process oflaw.65 
Dominican Migrant Interdiction Operations 
A relatively new development in Coast Guard alien migrant interdiction 
operations is the emergence of the Dominican Republic as a major source of 
undocumented aliens. Puerto Rico lies sixty miles beyond the east coast of the 
Dominican Republic. Migrants navigate the Mona Passage in small, open, 
wooden boats known as "yolas," powered by outboard motors. They are often 
camouflaged, covered with tarps, and drift during daylight hours to avoid 
detection. Many of these attempts to enter the United States illegally through 
Puerto Rico are organized alien smuggling ventures. Organizers can receive 
more than $40,000 for a single run.66 
With the decline in Haitian and Cuban migrants after 1994, the Coast 
Guard was able to dedicate more resources to patrolling the Mona Passage. 
Between 1994 and 1995, the number of undocumented aliens interdicted by 
the Coast Guard in the Mona Passage increased by more than 800 percent, 
from 371 to 3,375.67 Since that time, the Coast Guard has been patrolling the 
Mona Pass with a nearly constant presence of several cutters and aircraft. 
These efforts resulted in the interdiction of 6,273 Dominicans in fiscal year 
1996. When a yola is intercepted, the migrants are typically repatriated to the 
Dominican Republic, either by rendezvous and transfer to the Dominican 
Navy or by direct dockside repatriation in the Dominican Republic. 
A recent case illustrates the role of the Coast Guard in the Mona Passage. 
On 5 February 1997, the Coast Guard cutter Courageous was participating in 
Operation Frontier Shield68 in the Mona Passage. They spotted an overloaded, 
50-foot yola approximately 35 miles west of Puerto Rico. The cutter 
immediately launched both of its small boats. While they were handing out 
lifejackets to the migrants in preparation for their transfer to the cutter, the 
yola capsized, and 108 persons ended up in the water. One drowned, and three 
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were reported missing. The others were transferred to the INS in San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, three days later. 
The four Dominicans who coordinated the smuggling venture were indicted 
on 12 February 1997 for attempting to bring aliens into the United States 
illegally. The indictment charged them with violations of 8 USC 
§1324(a)(l)(A)(i), §1324(a)(l)(B)(iv), and 18 USC §2.69 They were held 
without bail, and if convicted, the four defendants could possibly receive the 
death penalty. As of this writing, the case is pending trial in the United States 
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. 
Chinese Migrant Interdiction Operations 
Sometime after midnight on 6 June. 1993, the MN Golden Venture ran 
aground on a sandbar approximately 100 yards off Long Island. State and 
federal law enforcement agencies, including the Coast Guard, began arriving 
en masse soon thereafter. Some of the 286 Chinese migrants on board were 
observed running on the beach, with others attempting to swim ashore in the 
53QF water. About 100 remained on the ship awaiting rescue. About 30 made it 
into the surrounding community. The others were detained in the custody of 
the INS. Exclusion proceedings were brought against the detainees, many of 
whom applied for political asylum. The legal issue raised by those proceedings 
was whether the Chinese were entitled to a deportation hearing by virtue of 
having "entered" the United States. In resolving the claims of those on board 
the MN Golden Venture, the Court of Appeals in Yangv. Maugans70 held that 
despite the fact that some migrants were walking ashore though the surf when 
apprehended, a person does not make an "entry" into the United States for 
purposes of INA deportation hearing entitlements until they are physically 
present on "dry land." 
Another case illustrates the problems involved in repatriating Chinese 
migrants interdicted on the high seas. Based on information obtained by an 
undercover agent for the INS during a complex sting operation, the Coast 
Guard cutter Reliance intercepted the MN Xing Da on 2 October 1996. The 
vessel was approximately 130 miles northeast of Bermuda, and, in addition to 
26 crew members, had 83 illegal Chinese migrants in the ship's cargo hold. The 
migrants had been in the cargo hold of the rusty, 220,foot freighter since it left 
China's Guang Zhou province more than three months previously on a voyage 
to a planned rendezvous in the Atlantic Ocean via Africa's Cape of Good 
Hope. A fishing vessel was then to embark the migrants and land them 
somewhere near Boston.71 
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When the MN Xing Da was first hailed on the radio by the Coast Guard, a 
person purporting to be the master consented to a Coast Guard boarding. The 
vessel flew no flag but had markings on the hull indicating the home port of the 
vessel was in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The "master" also claimed 
to be a PRC citizen. Documents were found on board which, while 
inconclusive, gave indications that the vessel might be validly registered in the 
PRe. Therefore, the Coast Guard requested through diplomatic channels that 
the PRC government confirm the registry of the vessel and grant permission for 
United States authorities to take any action necessary to insure the safety of 
those onboard. 
Some of the migrants were severely dehydrated and water had to be brought 
to the vessel. The decks were littered with debris and garbage. The vessel was 
also plagued with mechanical problems, had no electricity, and its bilge was 
filled with fuel that had leaked from the tanks. Soon after the Coast Guard 
boarding team came aboard, the migrants began setting fires and banging on 
the hull in an apparent attempt to sink the vessel. It was believed that the 
trouble was incited by enforcers called "snakeheads," who hoped to force the 
Coast Guard to bring them ashore in the United States.72 These migrants 
frequently pay up to $30,000 for their transportation and, in return, must 
liquidate their debt by working for the organizers at rates often below minimum 
wage for as long as 10 years.73 
The PRC government had some information about a vessel with the same 
name, but claimed they needed additional time to confirm the vessel's 
nationality as PRe. They did, however, give their consent for the United States 
to take whatever action was deemed necessary to ensure the safety of those on 
board in the interim. The government of Bermuda reluctantly permitted the 
Coast Guard to anchor the vessel temporarily as long as the migrants were 
removed from Bermuda as soon as possible. Consistent with the consent 
granted by the PRC to ensure the safety of those on board, they were 
transported to Guantanamo Bay for processing and eventually returned to the 
PRC by way of Wake Island.74 
It soon became apparent that the PRC government did not intend to 
unequivocally confirm the vessel's registry. The United States then informed 
them that unless they objected within a certain time, the vessel would be 
declared stateless and seized under United States law.75 Approximately two 
weeks after the initial interdiction, the vessel was assimilated to a stateless 
vessel and became subject to the full jurisdiction of the United States. 
Because of the distances involved, interdiction of Chinese migrant vessels 
are often resource intensive and come at a very high cost. The MN lung Sheng 
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#8 was first sighted on 27 June 1995, nearly 1,000 miles southeast of Hawaii. 
The interdiction operation involved three Coast Guard cutters, a C,130 
aircraft, an H,65 helicopter, and numerous land,based support personnel. The 
operation took forty,five days and covered 6,000 miles. The 147 migrants were 
transported to Wake Island, where a Joint Task Force had to be established to 
facilitate the return of the migrants to the PRC. It is estimated that the total 
cost of the interdiction of these 147 migrants exceeded $11 million.76 
On 12 August 1997, the 150,foot merchant vessel, Lapas No.3, was 
intercepted 200 miles south of San Diego with sixty,nine illegal Chinese 
migrants on board. The vessel had weathered three typhoons and was nearly 
out of food and fuel. Coast Guard units stayed on scene for more than two 
weeks providing food, water, and medical assistance. The Mexican 
government eventually agreed to tow the vessel to Mexico, where the migrants 
were then repatriated to China. 
The lliegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
On 30 September 1996, President Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).77 The entire 
system for deportation and exclusion of aliens was substantially modified. The 
concept of "entry" was replaced by "admission," which means the lawful entry 
of an alien into the United States after inspection by an immigration officer. 
IIRIRA §304 replaced both deportation and exclusion hearings with a single 
streamlined "removal proceeding."78 
Section 302 establishes a summary screening program which permits an INS 
officer to determine an alien inadmissible and order him or her removed from 
the United States without further hearing or judicial review. If such an alien 
indicates an intention to apply for asylum, the case must be referred to an 
asylum officer to conduct a "credible fear of persecution" screening to 
determine whether there is a significant possibility that the alien could 
establish eligibility for asylum. 
Under §302 an alien "present in the United States" is entitled to a removal 
proceeding which results in either admission, asylum, or removaI.79 But, 
determining whether an alien is "present in the United States" by using the 
"dry land" standard adopted by the court in Yang may not provide clear 
guidance to the Coast Guard in determining when an alien may be repatriated 
and when they have acquired a right to a removal proceeding. For example, 
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aliens on board a moored vessel, who disembark onto a pier, or who come 
ashore and then later return to their vessel, may not be on "dry land." 
Certain provisions of the IIRIRA have the potential for significant impact 
on Coast Guard alien migrant interdiction operations. For example, 8 USC 
§ 1231 (c) and (d) make the owner or commanding officer of a vessel or aircraft 
bringing an alien into the United States personally responsible for transporting 
an alien to the foreign country to which they are ordered removed. It also 
makes the owner or commanding officer financially responsible for the costs of 
both detaining and repatriating the alien. The statute does not explicitly 
provide for an exception to this requirement for public vessels. This mandate 
could place a large potential burden on the limited financial and operational 
resources of the Coast Guard. It could also discourage good Samaritans from 
complying with their legal obligations under both 46 USC §2304 and 
customary international law to render assistance to those in peril on the sea. 
Requiring a good Samaritan to bear the financial burden of detention and 
repatriation would unfairly penalize him or her for undertaking a rescue of 
anyone whose immigration status is uncertain. A direct result of this 
disincentive could be a greater demand on Coast Guard resources for search 
and rescue operations. 
"Expedited removal" is another provision of IIRIRA, which could have the 
potential for significant impact on Coast Guard alien migrant interdiction 
operations. It was created by §302,80 which amends 8 USC § 1225 to provide for 
a streamlined removal procedure of "applicants for admission" who are deemed 
inadmissible by an immigration officer. This procedure took effect on 1 April 
1997. Applicants for admission include aliens brought into the United States 
after having been interdicted at sea.81 An applicant may be deemed 
inadmissible for attempting to enter the United States through 
misrepresentation, fraud, or without valid travel and/or visa documents. Such 
applicants for admission may be removed without further hearing, appeal, or 
judicial review unless they affirmatively indicate either an intention to apply 
for asylum, or a fear of persecution if returned.82 Once ordered removed, 
removal must take place within ninety days. 
The IIRIRA also includes mass migration provisions in §372 which provide: 
In the event the Attorney General detennines that an actual or imminent infhn.: of 
aliens arriving off the coast of the United States, or near a land border, presents 
urgent circumstances requiring an immediate federal response, the Attorney 
General may authorize any State or local law enforcement officer ... to perform or 
exercise any of the powers, privileges, or duties conferred or imposed by this chapter 
or regulations issued hereunder upon officers or employees of the Service.S) 
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Section 372 could help avoid backlogs in the removal process during mass 
migrations, such as those from Haiti and Cuba, by ensuring that sufficient 
resources are made available for making admissibility determinations when 
necessary. 
From the Coast Guard's perspective, expedited removal could help reduce the 
resource burden during alien interdictions by obviating the need for cutters to be 
used as holding platforms. Once saturated with migrants, a cutter ceases to 
become an effective operational unit, and must focus all its efforts internally on 
the care, feeding, and security of the migrants. Using the expedited removal 
provisions, cutters could bring or transfer aliens into the United States for further 
return to their country of origin by another agency without implicating 
comprehensive and burdensome hearing entitlements. This would enable the 
cutters to perform their primary mission in their area of responsibility for longer 
periods of time, rather than merely acting as an inadequate holding facility with 
migrants on board for extended periods awaiting disposition and transportation. 
Whether or not these new procedures are expeditious in practice remains to 
be seen. If an interview is required to determine whether an applicant for 
admission has a credible fear of persecution, the applicant may request review 
by an immigration judge. This review must occur within seven days. While the 
immigration judge's decision is intended to be final, such administrative 
decisions have generally been held to be subject to judicial review. Litigation 
may be required to resolve this issue and could delay or prevent full 
implementation of the expedited removal procedures. In addition, another 
mass migration by sea could create a backlog of applicants burdening the 
system. This might make it impossible to meet the established timelines in the 
regulations and create political pressure from adversely affected communities. 
Except where the time and distance involved in direct repatriation is 
extraordinary, transportation of migrants interdicted at sea back to the United 
States for expedited removal by forward deployed Coast Guard cutters may be 
more resource intensive, logistically burdensome, and result in no net tactical 
advantage. As a result, expedited removal appears best suited for those 
migrants who manage to elude at,sea interdiction but for some reason arrive at 
a port of entry. It does not appear likely to replace the need for continuing 
Coast Guard operations to interdict and repatriate illegal alien migrants at sea. 
Notes 
An earlier version of this article appeared at 29 Connecticut Law Review 1565 (1997). 
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Lieutenant Rachel Canty, u.s. 
Coast Guard Reserve and Lieutenant Commander Anthony Gentillela, u.s. Coast 
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